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ANTICIPATING NEW REFERENCES: 
PREDICTING THE CONTOURS OF THE 
NEW “OTHERWISE AVAILABLE TO THE 
PUBLIC” CATEGORY OF PRIOR ART 
Abstract: As part of the move from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file patent 
system, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, passed in September 2011, 
modifies the novelty section of the patent statute. The new novelty section 
retains four familiar categories of prior art from the previous Patent Act, 
but also adds a new category: inventions “otherwise available to the pub-
lic.” The Act does not define “otherwise available to the public,” leaving 
unanswered questions of what the drafters intended the new category to 
capture, and whether it truly encompasses any new types of prior art. This 
Note draws insights from the development of standards governing the re-
tained categories of prior art, especially the printed publication category, 
to predict what new types of prior art references may be captured by the 
“otherwise available” language. Based on the policies underlying the 
“otherwise available” category, the Note argues that the language should 
be interpreted as extending the standards developed under the printed 
publication bar to non-documentary references, which would provide a 
flexible prior art category able to capture unanticipated new technologies 
and norms of disseminating information. 
Introduction 
 In September, 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (“America Invents Act”), representing the most significant 
reform of the United States patent system since 1952.1 As part of the 
move from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system, the Act modifies the 
prior art sections of the patent statute.2 Prior art is the type of knowl-
edge available to a person having ordinary skill in the art, and, under 
                                                                                                                      
1 H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38, 38 n.4 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 68 
& n.4; Michael Dixon, The Sweeping Changes of the 2011 America Invents Act, in Patents in 
the 21st Century: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 4, 4 (Deborah Nathan ed., 
2012); Harold C. Wegner, The 2011 Patent Law: Law and Practice, Gray on Claims, 6 
(Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.grayonclaims.com/storage/PatentLaw2011FourthEditionOct 
26REV.pdf.; see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
2 H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 42; see 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2006); Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1). 
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the Patent Act, is used to judge an invention’s novelty.3 The new novelty 
section, 102, retains the four familiar sources of prior art from the pre-
vious Patent Act—inventions in public use, on sale, described in a 
printed publication, and patented.4 The new novelty section, however, 
also includes a new prior art category: inventions “otherwise available 
to the public.”5 
 Because the four other categories of prior art have been incorpo-
rated into the Patent Act since 1836, they have widely understood mean-
ings and afford a degree of certainty for patent seekers and patent chal-
lengers.6 “Otherwise available” art, however, is wholly uncharted terri-
tory.7 At the same time, the broad interpretations given to the retained 
prior art categories raise questions about what is left, and what new types 
of references the drafters intended to capture with this category.8 In-
deed, the new novelty section has been criticized on these grounds.9 At 
least one academic has called for Congress to revise or eliminate the 
new language, arguing that the “otherwise available” category will gen-
erate years of unnecessary litigation to establish only very limited expan-
sions of the public domain.10 
 Barring such a drastic and decisive measure, however, the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO), the U.S. district courts, and particularly 
                                                                                                                      
3 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
4 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1). 
5 See id. 
6 Paul Morgan, The Ambiguity in Section 102(a)(1) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
2011 Patently-O Pat. L.J. 29, 29 (2011), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/ 
morgan.2011.aiaambiguities.pdf; see Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011: 
Navigating the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform, 93 J. 
Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 441, 470–71 (2011); infra notes 62–169 and accompanying 
text. 
7 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); Bui, supra note 6, at 
471; Morgan, supra note 6, at 29; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the 
New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Pat. L. J. 12, 25–28 (2011), available at http://www.pat 
entlyo.com/files/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf; Wegner, supra note 1, § 120, at 99. 
8 Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 25–28; Wegner, supra note 1, § 120, at 99; see Morgan, supra 
note 6, at 29. 
9 Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 25–28 (“Given the broad interpretation that has been given 
to ‘printed publication,’ moreover, the new category of ‘otherwise available to the public’ 
seems wholly unnecessary, unless it is based on either different policies or on a different 
scope of application than is reflected in the ‘printed publication’ case law.”); Wegner, supra 
note 1, § 120, at 99 (“Almost any invention that is widely disseminated in a tangible form 
to workers skilled in the art without secrecy restriction constitutes prior art as a ‘printed 
publication.’ It is difficult to imagine how an invention would be ‘otherwise available to the 
public’ when it would not also be a ‘printed publication’ within the meaning of the case 
law.”). 
10 Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 27–28. 
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, will be called upon to interpret 
the provision.11 Meanwhile, patentees and their counselors will operate 
in a period of uncertainty, because as of March 16, 2013, the novelty 
provisions of new section 102 will govern all new patent applications, as 
well as subsequent litigation of those patents.12 Determining what “oth-
erwise available” art will include is thus a consequential issue.13 
 This Note argues that the PTO and the courts should view the new 
“otherwise available to the public” category of prior art as an opportu-
nity to extend the public accessibility standard of the printed publica-
tion bar to disclosures in non-documentary form.14 After giving a brief 
overview of the U.S. patent system, Part I first discusses the changes 
made to the novelty provisions of the patent statute under the new 
America Invents Act.15 It then examines the policies underlying the 
statutory bars carried forward from the previous Patent Act and the 
development of standards governing those bars.16 Part II draws insights 
from the development of the retained statutory bars, noting that each 
bar has been interpreted broadly to effectuate its underlying policy 
goals.17 Part II also analyzes the legislative history of the “otherwise 
available” category.18 Part III argues that the “otherwise available” cate-
gory of prior art shares an underlying policy goal with the printed pub-
lication bar, and demonstrates that the standards developed under the 
printed publication bar can be easily adapted to non-documentary ref-
erences.19 Then, Part III illustrates some new types of references that 
could immediately become prior art under “otherwise available.”20 Fi-
nally, Part III argues that the most meaningful addition may lie in the 
category’s capacity for reaching unanticipated new technologies and 
norms for disseminating information that may not clearly fit within the 
other preexisting categories of prior art.21 
                                                                                                                      
11 Dixon, supra note 1, at 4; Bui, supra note 6, at 471; Morgan, supra note 6, at 29; 
Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 25–28; Wegner, supra note 1, § 120, at 99. 
12 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(n). 
13 See id. sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); Morgan, supra note 6, at 29. 
14 See infra notes 222–305 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 22–58 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 59–169 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 174–190 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 191–221 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 222–251 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 252–279 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 280–305 and accompanying text. 
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I. Section 102 Novelty Provisions, New and Old 
 Section A of this Part provides a brief overview of the United States 
patent system and the statutory requirement of novelty.22 Section B dis-
cusses the relevant goals of the America Invents Act, and identifies the 
changes made to the novelty provisions of the Patent Act.23 Section C 
identifies the underlying policies of the statutory bars retained from 
the previous Patent Act and examines the development of standards 
governing those bars.24 
A. Overview of the United States Patent System and Novelty Requirement 
 The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to grant patent rights in 
Article I, Section 8, which authorizes the Legislative Branch to “pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Dis-
coveries.”25 If granted a patent, an inventor has the exclusive right to 
make, use, offer to sell, or sell the invention in the United States for a 
fixed term, currently twenty years from the date the inventor files an 
application.26 
 To receive a patent, an inventor must apply to the PTO, the ad-
ministrative agency charged with granting patents.27 The PTO then 
determines whether the invention meets a number of statutory re-
quirements.28 The invention must fit into a category of “patentable sub-
ject matter” defined by the Patent Act,29 and must be useful,30 novel,31 
and nonobvious in light of previous inventions and current technol-
gy.
                                                                                                                     
o 32 
 Determining whether an invention is novel requires comparing it 
to the “prior art” identified by section 102 of the Patent Act.33 The 
enumerated categories of “prior art” represent Congress’s judgment of 
 
22 See infra notes 25–38 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 39–58 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 59–169 and accompanying text. 
25 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
26 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1)–(2), 271 (2006). 
27 Id. § 2. 
28 See id.; infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
29 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 161, 171 (2006). 
30 See id. § 101. 
31 See id. § 102. 
32 See id. § 103. 
33 Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their 
Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 217, 242 (2006); see 35 U.S.C. § 102; infra notes 34–35 and ac-
companying text. 
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what knowledge is available for a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to draw from as of the “critical date,” or date from which an invention’s 
novelty is judged.34 If the invention is disclosed by or obvious in light of 
these sources of knowledge, the prior art is said to “anticipate” the in-
pellate jurisdiction over patent cases and appeals of 
PTO decisions.38 
                                                                                                                     
vention, or render it unpatentable for want of novelty.35 
 If the PTO denies a patent because it determines an invention is 
not novel or fails to meet another statutory requirement, an inventor is 
not without judicial remedies.36 Before 1982, an inventor aggrieved by 
the PTO’s decision could appeal to the U.S. Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals.37 In 1982, however, Congress abolished this court and es-
tablished the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which now 
holds exclusive ap
B. Changes to the Novelty Provisions Under the America Invents Act 
 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, passed in September, 2011, 
is the most significant reform of the U.S. patent system since 1952.39 
Among other goals, the Act aims to increase the quality of patents is-
sued by the PTO by addressing concerns that questionable patents are 
too easily obtained.40 Furthermore, the Act aims to harmonize Amer-
ica’s patent-granting standards with those of other major foreign patent 
systems.41 Through these changes, Congress seeks to establish a more 
 
34 Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d at 1453 (“[Knowledge] is available, in legal theory at least, 
when it is described in the world’s accessible literature, including patents, or has been 
publicly known or in the public use or on sale ‘in this country.’ That is the real meaning of 
‘prior art’ in legal theory—it is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvi-
ous from it, at a given time, to a person of ordinary skill in an art. Society, speaking 
through Congress and the courts, has said ‘thou shalt not take it away.’”) (internal cita-
tions omitted); see Bagley, supra note 33, at 242. 
35 Black’s Law Dictionary 108 (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
36 See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
37 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1989); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 
Geo. L.J. 1437, 1452 (2012). 
38 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006); see Gugliuzza, supra note 37, at 1457. See generally Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (abolishing Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals and establishing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
39 E.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38 & n.4 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
67, 68 & n.4; Dixon, supra note 1, at 4; Wegner, supra note 1, at 6; see Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
40 H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39. 
41 Id. 
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efficient, streamlined patent system that continues to encourage inno-
vation according to the constitutional imperative to “promote the Pro-
res
s, as every other industri-
lize
tented or described in a 
rin
ctions of third parties, but also by the activities of 
     
g s of Science and useful Arts.”42 
 One of the most significant changes made by the America Invents 
Act is the move from a system that awards patents to the first person to 
invent to one that grants patents to the first inventor to file for a patent, 
subject to some exceptions.43 This represents a step toward harmoniz-
ing the U.S. system with that of foreign nation
a d nation employs a first-to-file system.44 
 Under the Patent Act’s first-to-invent system, an inventor is entitled 
to a patent only if her invention meets the novelty requirements of old 
section 102(a).45 Old section 102(a) precludes inventors from patent-
ing inventions that, before the applicant’s date of invention, were “known 
or used by others” in the United States, or “pa
p ted publication” anywhere in the world.46 
 Even if an invention were truly new to the world, however, an in-
ventor could lose her right to a patent under old section 102(b).47 Sec-
tion 102(b) precludes patentability if, more than one year before the 
date of application, the invention was “patented or described in a 
printed publication” anywhere in the world or was “in public use or on 
sale” in the United States.48 These are the so-called “statutory bars” to 
patentability.49 Unlike old section 102(a), the statutory bars of old sec-
tion 102(b) are triggered after the date of invention and may be impli-
cated not only by the a
the inventor herself.50 
 As part of the move to a first-to-file system, Congress made substan-
tial changes to the novelty sections of the Patent Act by altering the cat-
                                                                                                                 
42 Id. at 40; see U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
43 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)–(b). The system under 
the America Invents Act is not an unqualified first-inventor-to-file system. See id. Under new 
§ 102(b)(1)(B), an inventor who publicly discloses his invention is given a one-year grace 
period in which the inventor has the exclusive right to file a patent. See id. sec. 3(b)(1), 
§ 102(b)(1)(B). In other words, an inventor may be eligible for a patent—even if not the 
first close the invention and subsequently files 
with
ep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40. 
2(a) (2006). 
 to file—if she was the first to publicly dis
in a year. See id. 
44 See H.R. R
45 35 U.S.C. § 10
46 Id. 
47 Id. § 102(b). 
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 See 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 6.02 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). 
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egories of prior art that may prevent an invention’s patentability.51 The 
America Invents Act eliminates the previous section 102(a), which pro-
vides for types of prior art that destroy novelty if they exist before the 
date of invention.52 The Act’s new section 102(a)(1) converts the statu-
tory bars of old section 102(b) into prior art categories that apply be-
fore a patent’s effective filing date, without any geographical restric-
tions.53 New section 102(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, “A person 
shall be entitled to a patent unless—(1) the claimed invention was pat-
ented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or 
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention.”54 Thus, the new section retains the familiar pat-
ented and printed publication categories, as well as the public use and 
n-sa
es of prior art will be captured by this 
category remains unanswered.58 
                                                                                                                     
o le bars.55 
 In addition, the America Invents Act adds a new category of prior 
art: inventions “otherwise available to the public.”56 The new Patent Act 
does not define “otherwise available to the public.”57 As a result, the 
question of what, if any, new typ
C. Statutory Bars Retained from Old 102(a) 
 This section aims to determine what the new “otherwise available 
to the public” category of prior art should cover, looking to prior art 
categories retained under the America Invents Act.59 This Section ex-
amines the types of references, or sources of prior art, that are already 
captured by those categories retained from the previous Patent Act— 
descriptions in printed publications, patented inventions, and inven-
tions in public use or on sale—to help define the boundaries of the un-
certain “otherwise available” category.60 In addition, this Section exam-
 
51 H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 42–43 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 72–
2, effective Mar. 16, 2013) 
(set
 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
th America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1). 
73. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (setting forth prior art categories under the previous 
Patent Act), with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102, 
125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 10
ting forth prior art categories under the new Patent Act). 
52 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); see 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
53 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); see
54 Leahy-Smi
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id.; Morgan, supra note 6, at 29. 
59 See infra notes 62–169 and accompanying text. 
60 See infra notes 62–169 and accompanying text. 
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ines the policies driving the statutory bars to guide an assessment of 
al date.62 Under new section 
2(
 that was already available to the public, thereby with-
drawing it from the public domain.64 This policy is based on the prin-
ublic domain, it may not 
e p
as evolved 
are sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.67 
                                                                                                                     
what “otherwise available to the public” should include.61 
1. Printed Publications 
 New section 102(a)(1), like its predecessor section 102(b), pro-
vides that an invention is not entitled to a patent if it was described in a 
printed publication before the critic
10 a)(1), the critical date is the effective patent-filing date or, in the 
case of an inventor who publicly discloses an invention and files within 
a year, the date of public disclosure.63 
 The primary policy rationale underlying the printed publication 
bar is to prevent an inventor from acquiring an exclusive patent right 
to an invention
ciple that once an invention has entered the p
b atented.65 
a. Development of the Printed Publication Category 
 Since it was introduced into the patent statutes in 1836, the statu-
tory phrase “printed publication” has developed a broad meaning, quite 
distinct from its common, everyday usage.66 The category h
from a narrow one, capturing only references that met rigid standards, 
to a wide-reaching category that encompasses all printed references that 
 
61 See infra notes 62–169 and accompanying text. 
62 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); see 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2006). 
63 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)–(b). 
64 E.g., Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re 
Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
65 In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This is based on the contract theory of 
patents, that the quid pro quo of the right to exclude is conferring something new to the 
public; if the information disclosed in a patent is already owned by the public, there is a 
lack of consideration. In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1359–60 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Tenney, 
254 F.2d, 619, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1958); see Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) 
(“If the public were already in possession and common use of an invention fairly and with-
out fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not intend 
to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which was already common. 
There would be no quid pro quo-no price for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred 
upon the inventor . . . .”). 
66 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 
at 899–900; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226–27. 
67 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348 & n.2; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 225–26. 
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 At first, courts relied on rigid standards of printing and publication, 
both of which had to be satisfied in order to fall within the statutory 
bar.68 The earliest cases interpreting “printed publication” required 
printing by an actual printing press.69 By the late 1930’s, however, some 
lower courts had begun to interpret “printed publications” to include 
typewritten pieces, even though the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals declined to do so.70 In 1958, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, which had jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO before Con-
gress established the Federal Circuit, recognized the anomalous results 
created by the law of that time.71 In the case of In re Tenney, the court 
held that a microfilm copy of a typewritten German patent application 
located in the U.S. Library of Congress was not “printed,” and therefore 
did not constitute a printed publication under the statute.72 The court 
did recognize the oddity of its decision, noting that a typewritten foreign 
patent file, available for public viewing in the United States, would not be 
a printed publication within the meaning of the statute, but a traditional 
                                                                                                                     
printed document available only in a foreign library would be consid-
ered a printed publication under the statute.73 
 
68 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 225; see also In re Bayer, 568 F.2d at 1359 (“Appellant does 
not dispute that his thesis is printed. Accordingly, the dispositive issue is whether appel-
lant’s uncatalogued, unshelved thesis, by virtue of its accessibility to the graduate commit-
tee, is a ‘publication’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”); In re Tenney, 254 F.2d at 
622 (“[W]e are of the opinion that the microfilm in the instant case is not a ‘printed pub-
lication’ within the contemplation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and that, therefore, the decision 
of the board must be reversed. More specifically, we are of the opinion that the microfilm 
is not ‘printed.’”). 
69 Max Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspace and Patent Law, 
51 Fla. L. Rev. 229, 249 (1999). 
70 See Hamilton Labs., Inc. v. Massengill, 111 F.2d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 1940); Gulliksen v. 
Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252, 253 (Pat. & Tr. Off. Bd. App. 1937); George A. Herbster, It’s Time 
to Take the “Printing” Out of “Printed Publications,” 49 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 38, 40–44 (1967); 
Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 249–51. See generally Robert I. Coulter, Typewritten Library 
Manuscripts Are Not “Printed Publications,” 36 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 258 (1954) (discussing Pat-
ent Office Board of Appeals cases finding typewritten pieces to be printed publications 
and arguing that courts should decline to follow). In the 1937 Patent Office Board of Ap-
peals case Gulliksen v. Halberg, the first to hold a typewritten document constituted a print-
ed publication, the reference at issue was a typewritten thesis stored in the stacks of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology library. Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 253. One examiner 
said in dissent, “If the words ‘printed’ and ‘publication’ be separately considered, it is my 
view that the thesis is neither ‘printed’ nor is it a ‘publication’ as these words are employed 
in the statute.” Id. at 254 (Edinburg, dissenting). In the dissent’s view, typewriting was not a 
form of “printing” as contemplated by Congress in the patent statutes, and depositing the 
thesis in the university’s library did not constitute “publication.” Id. at 255–56. 
71 In re Tenney, 254 F.2d at 627. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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 The In re Tenney court interpreted the printed publication bar as 
focused on the probability that the subject matter would be made 
known to the public.74 The stringent requirements of printing and pub-
lication were justified because a printing by traditional methods gave 
rise to a presumption of public knowledge.75 Printing, the court rea-
soned, indicates intent to achieve wide circulation and a probability 
that this circulation was achieved.76 On the other hand, a person pub-
shi
 sense, but rather whether it had been dis-
m
ether 
                                                                                                                     
li ng copies by microfilm may be as likely to produce only one copy as 
to produce many.77 
 Although these rigid standards of printing and publication domi-
nated for more than two decades, a line of cases emerged that rejected 
the dual-requirement approach and instead treated printed publication 
as a single concept.78 These cases articulated a conception of printed 
publication that considered not whether a reference was printed or 
published in the traditional
se inated or otherwise made available to the public interested and or-
dinarily skilled in the art.79 
 In the influential 1966 case I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., for ex-
ample, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
like the court in In re Tenney, considered whether a patent application 
on microfilm was a printed publication.80 Acknowledging that the In re 
Tenney court’s rationale was probably valid when the case was considered 
in 1958, the court decided that it was no longer reasonable to assume 
that traditional methods of printing were the only way to ensure that a 
reference was accessible to the interested public.81 The court suggested 
that in light of modern techniques for conveying information, such as 
photocopying, photo-offset printing, computing, electrostatic printing, 
and xerography, a preferable rationale for the In re Tenney decision 
would have been that the microfilmed patent application—wh
“printed” or not—was not shown to be sufficiently accessible to the pub-
lic to constitute a publication within the meaning of the statute.82 
 
74 Id. at 626. 
75 Id. at 626–27. 
76 See id. 
77 In re Tenney, 254 F.2d at 627. 
78 In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 225; see Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & 
Elecs. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1971); I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 
250 F. Supp. 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
79 See Philips, 450 F.2d at 1170; I.C.E., 250 F. Supp. at 742. 
80 I.C.E., 250 F. Supp. at 739. 
81 Id. at 742. 
82 Id. 
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 This expansive, results-oriented approach took hold in the U.S. 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the seminal 1981 case of In re 
Wyer.83 There, the court again considered whether a foreign patent ap-
plication on microfilm was a printed publication.84 In In re Wyer, a mi-
crofilm copy of an Australian patent application had been presented 
for public inspection in the Australian Patent Office and an abstract of 
the patent had been published.85 A second microfilm copy was cut up 
to produce six diazo copies of the application.86 Of those six diazo cop-
ies, one was retained with the second, cut up microfilm copy, at the 
Australian Patent Office, while the other five were distributed to the 
Australian Patent Office’s sub-offices.87 All of the offices maintained 
t further research or experimenta-
equipment for displaying and producing copies of the application for 
purchase by the public.88 
 The In re Wyer court rejected the traditional dichotomy between 
“printing” and “publication,” and announced that the printed publica-
tion bar should be approached as a unitary concept.89 The court held 
that the determination of whether a prior art reference is a printed 
publication is a fact-specific inquiry, and as such must consider whether 
the reference was accessible to those interested and ordinarily skilled in 
the art.90 Under the In re Wyer court’s reasoning, to establish a refer-
ence as a printed publication, the document must be disseminated or 
otherwise made available prior to the critical date.91 This standard re-
quires that an interested person ordinarily skilled in the art, exercising 
reasonable diligence, could locate the reference and comprehend the 
essentials of the invention withou
tion.92 Applying that standard, the court held that the Australian appli-
cation was a printed publication.93 
                                                                                                                      
83 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; see also Steven J. Rothschild & Thomas P. White, Printed 
Pub & Trademark Off. Soc’y 42, 43–46 (1988) (explain-
ing the development of the unitary approach to the printed publication bar). 
 F.2d at 222–23. 
t 223. 
t 226. 
 Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226. 
lication: What Is It Now?, 70 J. Pat. 
84 In re Wyer, 655
85 Id. 
86 Id. a
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. a
90 In re
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 226–27. 
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 The In re Wyer court’s interpretation set a rather low bar for find-
ing a prior art reference to be a printed publication.94 For example, in 
its 1985 decision in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortai 
(MIT), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that a 
paper delivered orally at a conference was a printed publication be-
cause at least six copies of the paper were distributed.95 Additionally, in 
1986, the Federal Circuit ruled in In re Hall that a single doctoral thesis 
catalogued and indexed in a German university library was a printed 
publication.96 The court reasoned that, having been catalogued and 
 to those interested in the 
accessibility has 
                                                                                                                     
indexed, the thesis was sufficiently accessible
art exercising reasonable diligence.97 
b. Public Accessibility Emerges as the Key Concept 
 Although MIT and In re Hall appeared to rest on whether the ref-
erences were distributed or indexed, general public 
emerged as the key concept in adjudicating printed publications.98 Dis-
semination and indexing are only important insofar as they indicate 
that a reference is accessible to the interested public.99 
 The Federal Circuit announced the primacy of public accessibility 
in the printed publication analysis in the 2004 case, In re Klopfenstein.100 
In that case, the court considered whether a fourteen-slide presentation 
was a printed publication where it had been printed and pasted onto 
poster boards and displayed for two and one half days at a conference, 
 
352; In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 899–900; Mass. Inst. 
of T 09 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 indexed in a meaningful way. Id. at 
116
led the “touchstone” in deter-
min t 
899 568 F.2d at 1359. 
F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350. 
tein, 380 F.3d at 1350. 
94See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1
ech. v. AB Fortai, 774 F.2d 1104, 11
95 Mass. Inst. of Tech., 774 F.2d at 1109. 
96 In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 898–900. 
97 Id. at 900. Three years later, in the 1989 case In re Cronyn, the Federal Circuit distin-
guished In re Hall from the case at bar, in which three undergraduate theses were pre-
sented to a panel of four faculty members and copies were filed in the college’s main li-
brary and in the library of the chemistry department. 890 F.2d 1158, 1159–61 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). The theses were not indexed or catalogued, although the student authors’ names 
and thesis titles were listed on individual cards and filed alphabetically by author name. Id. 
at 1159. The court ruled that the references were not printed publications because, unlike 
in In re Hall, the theses had not been catalogued or
1. Because the theses could only be located by student name, and not by subject matter, 
they were not reasonably accessible to the public. Id. 
98 See Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1350; In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348; In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 
898–99. Indeed, public accessibility has frequently been cal
ing whether a reference constitutes a printed publication. E.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d a
; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 224; In re Bayer, 
99 In re Lister, 583 
100 In re Klopfens
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and less than a day at a second conference.101 The inventors argued that 
the slides were not a printed publication because no copies of the pres-
entation were distributed and it had not been catalogued or indexed in 
any library.102 The court rejected the inventors’ claim that distribution 
or indexing was necessary, but recognized that these factors are often 
at the reference was suffi-
ciently publicly accessible to constitute a printed publication because it 
 many of whom possessed 
has continued to capture new technology over the past two decades.108 
During the 1990s, and even into the 2000s, there was a great deal of 
deb culation as to whether Internet postings would be con-
sid ations.109 Although the Federal Circuit has never 
                                                                   
indicators of public accessibility.103 Although the court acknowledged a 
previous holding that “dissemination” was necessary, the court held that 
dissemination was required only in the broad sense of fostering general 
knowledge, not in the sense of distribution of physical copies.104 
 The In re Klopfenstein court also identified four factors to help re-
solve whether a temporarily displayed reference, neither distributed 
nor indexed, was sufficiently accessible to the public.105 The court con-
sidered: (1) the length of time the presentation was displayed; (2) the 
expertise of the target audience; (3) the presence or absence of rea-
sonable expectations that the material displayed would not be copied; 
and (4) the simplicity or ease with which the audience could have cop-
ied the material.106 The court reasoned th
had been shown to a wide variety of viewers,
ordinary skill in the art, without a stated expectation that the informa-
tion would not be copied or reproduced.107 
c. The Reach of the Printed Publication Category 
 The printed publication bar, and its focus on public accessibility, 
ate and spe
ere intedd pr  public
                                                   
 
101 Id. at 1347. 
102 Id. at 1348. 
103 Id. at 1350. 
104 See id. at 1348 n.3. 
105 Id. at 1350. 
106 In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350. 
107 Id. at 1352. 
108 See, e.g., In re Lister, 583 F.3d at 1315–16 (considering whether a manuscript in-
cluded in databases accessible using the Internet was a printed publication); SRI Int’l, Inc. 
v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1196–98 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (analyzing whether a 
paper posted on a file transfer protocol server was a printed publication). 
109 See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 257–61 (concluding that “general Internet 
postings do not satisfy the requirements for printed publications”); Neal P. Pierotti, Does 
Internet Information Count as a Printed Publication?, 42 IDEA 249, 259–77 (2002) (proposing 
standards under which an Internet document could constitute a printed publication); 
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squarely addressed the issue, two recent decisions indicate that the 
mere fact that a reference is available on the Internet, rather than in a 
tangible form, does not prevent it from being a printed publication, at 
least where it is accessible to the interested public.110 
 In 2008, in SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether a pa-
per posted for seven days in 1997 on SRI’s file transfer protocol server 
was sufficiently accessible to constitute a printed publication.111 Al-
though the court remanded the case to determine whether an anony-
mous user skilled in the art in 1997 would have been able to gain access 
and navigate the server’s directory structure to find the paper, the 
court did not question that materials posted on a website could be con-
sidered a printed publication.112 The paper’s Internet-only availability 
did not enter the court’s analysis; instead, the court indicated that the 
absence of an index, catalogue, or other method of searching for the 
paper precluded a finding of public accessibility at summary judg-
ment.113 
 A reference’s accessibility over the Internet also played a key role 
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s analysis in the 
2009 case, In re Lister.114 In this case, the reference, a manuscript regis-
tered with and retained in print at the U.S. Copyright Office, had been 
listed in the office’s automated catalogue and two commercial data-
bases, Westlaw and Dialog, all accessible using the Internet.115 The 
court concluded that the manuscript was publicly accessible as of the 
date it was listed in the commercial databases, because the databases 
                                                                                                                      
Jennifer M. Wright, A Contemporary Patent Act: Finding a Useful Definition of “Printed Publica-
tion” in the Age of the Internet and On-line Research, 85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 732, 
744–50 (2003) (suggesting guidelines to judge an Internet document’s “printed publica-
tion” status, with particular attention to standards for authenticating Internet documents); 
G. Andrew Barger, Comment, Lost in Cyberspace: Inventors, Computer Piracy and “Printed Publi-
ent placed on an Internet bulletin 
boa
 Supp. 2d 623, 626 n.7 (D. Del. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 
511
the paper to be sufficiently accessible to the public. Id. at 1200–01 
(Mo  
5–17. 
–15. 
cations” Under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act, 71 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 353, 359–68 (1994) 
(considering the circumstances under which a docum
rd system would constitute a printed publication). 
110 See In re Lister, 583 F.3d at 1315–16; SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1196–98. 
111 SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1194–97. File Transfer Protocol is a system for exchanging files 
over a computer network such as the Internet or an intranet. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. 
Sys., Inc., 456 F.
 F.3d 1186. 
112 SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1196–98. Indeed, Judge Kimberly Ann Moore, arguing in dis-
sent, would have found 
ore, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 1196–98. 
114 In re Lister, 583 F.3d at 131
115 Id. at 1309–10, 1314
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were searchable by keyword, but remanded because there was insuffi-
ased breadth, 
er
asty 
eth
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts quickly dis-
                                                                                                                     
cient evidence that it had been included in either database as of the 
critical date.116 
d. Limits of the Printed Publication Bar 
 Despite the printed publication category’s incre
th e are some areas it has never expanded to cover.117 For example, 
the Federal Circuit noted in dicta in In re Klopfenstein that an entirely 
oral presentation that includes neither slides nor copies of the presen-
tation is “without question” not a printed publication.118 
 Some other areas have remained unsettled.119 As prior art refer-
ences look increasingly less like traditional printed publications, uncer-
tainty arises regarding the contours of the printed publication bar.120 
Lower courts have split, for example, on whether videotape recordings 
can constitute printed publications.121 In 2004, in Grayzel v. St. Jude Med-
ical, Inc., for example, the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey held that a patent on an improved catheter for a particular 
method of angioplasty was anticipated—and thus unpatentable for lack 
of novelty—by a video in which a doctor demonstrated the angiopl
m od.122 The court relied on both the visual images represented in 
the video and the narration in determining that the video covered each 
element of the patentee’s claim.123 The court operated under the pre-
sumption that a videotape could qualify as a printed publication.124 
 In contrast, in the 2006 case of Diomed, Inc. v. Angiodynamics, Inc., 
 
lopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1349 n.4. 
finding a video recording to be a printed publication suffi-
cien
vision programs as printed publications 
and ferences”). 
 Cir. 2008); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 
1323
8. 
116 Id. at 1314–16. 
117 See In re K
118 Id. 
119 See Diomed, Inc. v. Angiodynamics, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 130, 141–42 (D. Mass. 
2006) (dismissing arguments that a video recording could constitute a printed publica-
tion); Grayzel v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 466, 477–78 (D.N.J. 2004), aff’d, 162 F. 
App’x 954 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (
t to anticipate a patent). 
120 See Diomed, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 141–42; Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78. 
121 See Diomed, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 141–42; Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78; cf. Mossman 
v. Broderbund Software, Inc., No. 98-71244-DT, 1999 WL 696007, at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 
1999) (noting PTO rejection of videotapes and tele
characterization as “not usable as re
122 Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
123 See id. at 477–78. To anticipate a patent claim, a single prior art reference must dis-
close each claim element either expressly or inherently. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, 
Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed.
, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
124 See Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 477–7
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missed arguments that a video could qualify as a printed publication.125 
Relying on In re Klopfenstein, the court reasoned that even though the 
video was disseminated to a large number of people over several years, 
ted” component was dispositive.126 To date, 
ow
 
and its progeny demonstrate, patents and their applications, which are 
nt offices throughout the world, are also 
ns
date of the claimed invention.”131 These categories 
are likewise present under old section 102(b), although they were tied 
to the critical date of one year before the filing date, rather than the 
filing date itself.132 
     
the absence of any “prin
h ever, the Federal Circuit has not ruled on the issue.127 
2. “Patented” Inventions 
 The continued exclusion of already-patented inventions from pat-
ent eligibility under new section 102(a)(1) aids little in the determina-
tion of what will constitute prior art “otherwise available to the public,” 
because the category has mostly been swallowed by the liberal printed 
publication standard.128 U.S. patents are unquestionably “publicly acces-
sible” at the Patent Office’s library and on the Internet.129 As In re Wyer
catalogued and indexed in pate
co idered sufficiently publicly accessible to be printed publications.130 
3. In Public Use and On Sale 
 Under the America Invents Act’s revised section 102(a)(1), an in-
vention is not patentable if it was “in public use [or] on sale . . . before 
the effective filing 
                                                                                                                 
125 Diomed, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 141–42. 
126 Id. 
127 See Grayzel, 162 F. App’x at 962. Although the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower 
cour
ublication, a journal article, to find anticipation. See id. The court did not con-
side
0 E.g., In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226–27; see Bruckelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378 (finding two fig-
ure
nts Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 
2013). 
132 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
t’s decision in Grayzel in a nonprecedential opinion, the court relied on another 
printed p
r whether the video was an anticipating reference. See id. 
128 See Bruckelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226–27; Morgan, supra note 
6, at 29. 
129 See Google Patents, http://www.google.com/patents (last visited Aug. 22, 2012); 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/ (last visited Aug. 
22, 2012). 
13
s in a Canadian patent application laid open in the Hull, Quebec patent office to be 
printed publications even though they were canceled and not included in the issued pat-
ent). 
131 Leahy-Smith America Inve
2012] The America Invents Act & the Contours of “Otherwise Available to the Public” 1549 
 The public use and on-sale bars share four policy concerns.133 
First, they both have the general purpose of encouraging inventors to 
promptly disclose their new inventions by patenting them.134 Second, 
both bars prevent detrimental public reliance on disclosures made be-
fore patenting.135 Third, the bars prevent inventors from commercially 
exploiting their inventions before applying for a patent, limiting the 
period of exclusivity to the statutory patent term.136 Fourth, the bars 
allow inventors a reasonable amount of time to pursue patenting after 
sales activity or public testing.137 
a. In Public Use 
 The public use bar aims to prevent detrimental public reliance on 
an invention.138 Once disclosed, the public may justifiably believe that 
the invention is in the public domain.139 Members of the public may 
rely on that belief and invest in appropriating the invention in various 
ways.140 In these circumstances, the law will not allow the inventor to 
                                                                                                                      
133 TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Gen. Elec-
tric Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981); William C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard 
von Hoffmann, III, Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use, and the “On Sale” and “Public Use” Bars 
to Patentability, 63 St. John’s L. Rev. 1, 33–44 (1988); Patrick J. Barrett, Note, New Guidelines 
for Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 730, 732–36 (1972). 
134 TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968; Gen. Electric, 654 F.2d at 61; Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, 
supra note 133, at 38–39; Barrett, supra note 133, at 733–34. As Justice Joseph Story ex-
plained in the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal 1829 case, Pennock v. Dialogue, prompt disclo-
sures further the constitutional objective of promoting the progress of science and the 
useful arts by giving the public right to make, use, and sell the invention as early as possi-
ble. 27 U.S. at 19. The earlier inventions are patented, the earlier they become part of the 
pool of public knowledge and are able to stimulate further innovation. See TP Labs., 724 
F.2d at 968; Gen. Electric, 654 F.2d at 61; Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 133, at 38; 
Barrett, supra note 133, at 733–34. 
135 TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968; Gen. Electric, 654 F.2d at 61; Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, 
supra note 133, at 34–38; Barrett, supra note 133, at 733. 
136 TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968; Gen. Electric, 654 F.2d at 61; Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, 
supra note 133, at 39–42; Barrett, supra note 133, at 734–35. 
137 TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968; Gen. Electric, 654 F.2d at 61; Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, 
supra note 133, at 42–44; Barrett, supra note 133, at 735. 
138 Cont’l Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 
1079 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“‘Public use’ and ‘on-sale’ bars, while they share the same statutory 
basis, are grounded on different policy emphases. The primary policy underlying the ‘pub-
lic use’ case is that of detrimental public reliance, whereas the primary policy underlying 
an ‘on-sale’ case is that of prohibiting the commercial exploitation of the design beyond 
the statutorily prescribed time period.”). 
139 Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 133, at 34; Barrett, supra note 133, at 733; 
see TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968. 
140 Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 133, at 34–35; Barrett, supra note 133, at 
733; see TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968. 
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obtain a patent and thereby remove the invention from the public do-
main.141 
 The threshold for public use is quite low; it requires little use and 
little publicity to demonstrate public use within the meaning of the Pat-
ent Act.142 Public use includes any non-experimental use of an invention 
by a person other than the inventor as long as that person is under no 
limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.143 
 The Supreme Court, in the 1881 decision Egbert v. Lippman, estab-
lished the classic standard for assessing public use.144 In Egbert, a pat-
entee developed an improvement in corset-steels and presented two 
pairs of the steels to his female friend, who used them under her gar-
ments for more than two years before he applied for a patent.145 Al-
though the inventor received no commercial advantage, the steels were 
used with no obligation of secrecy and not merely for experimenta-
tion.146 The Court held that even though the use was not in public view, 
it nevertheless constituted public use within the meaning of the Patent 
Act.147 
 Although Egbert demonstrates that “public use” is largely equiva-
lent to “non-secret use,” as interpreted under the old Patent Act, the 
public use bar also covers wholly secret commercial uses.148 Application 
of the public use bar means that an inventor may elect to protect his 
innovation either through secrecy or patent, but may not extend the 
term of his exclusive right by using both.149 Judge Billings Learned 
Hand considered this situation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Se-
                                                                                                                      
141 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
142 Chisum, supra note 50, § 6.02[5]; see, e.g., Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 
307 U.S. 5, 20 (1939) (“A mere experimental use is not the public use defined by the Act, 
but a single use for profit, not purposely hidden, is such. The ordinary use of a machine or 
the practise of a process in a factory in the usual course of producing articles for commer-
cial purposes is a public use.”); Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336–37 (1881). 
143 E.g., Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eli 
Lilly v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Egbert, 104 
U.S. at 336. 
144 Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336–37; see Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
145 Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335. 
146 Id. at 337. 
147 Id. 
148 See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d 
Cir. 1946). Note, however, that it is not clear whether this application of the public use bar 
is valid under new section 102(a)(1). See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
149 See, e.g., Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520; Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 133, at 
41; Barrett, supra note 133, at 734. 
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cond Circuit’s 1946 case, Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Baring & 
Auto Parts Co.150 In that case, the inventor had used a method of pre-
paring metal surfaces for a process known as “metalizing” as a trade 
secret for more than one year before applying for a patent on the proc-
ess.151 Judge Hand ruled that, even though the use occurred in secret, 
such commercial exploitation of the invention forfeited the inventor’s 
right to a patent, regardless of how little the public may have learned 
about the invention.152 
                                                                                                                     
b. On Sale 
 The on-sale bar, like the public use bar, has one primary policy ra-
tionale.153 The on-sale bar prohibits inventors from commercially ex-
ploiting their inventions before seeking a patent, and thereby extend-
ing their exclusivity period beyond the statutory term.154 To that end, 
the bar excludes from patentability inventions that were on sale before 
the critical date.155 
 Quite like the development of the printed publication bar, courts’ 
interpretation of “on sale” has evolved from one in line with the term’s 
common usage to one much broader in scope.156 Historically, under 
the so-called “on-hand doctrine,” the bar was not invoked unless an in-
vention was truly “on sale” in the sense that it was not only reduced to 
practice, but was in inventory and ready for delivery before the critical 
date.157 In the influential 1975 case, Timely Products Corp. v. Arron, how-
ever, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the on-
hand doctrine in favor of a three-part test that eliminated the require-
ment that the invention be ready for delivery, but maintained the re-
 
150 Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 517–18. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 520. 
153 See Cont’l Plastic, 141 F.3d at 1079; Gen. Electric, 654 F.2d at 61; Rooklidge & von 
Hoffmann, supra note 133, at 33–34; Barrett, supra note 133, at 732–33. 
154 Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002); STX, 
LLC v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cont’l Plastic, 141 F.3d at 1079; Ferag 
AG v. Quipp, Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1567–68 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
155 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
156 See William C. Rooklidge, The On Sale and Public Use Bars to Patentability: The Policies 
Reexamined, 1 Fed. Cir. B.J. 7, 7–8 (1991) (“The phrases ‘public use’ and ‘on sale,’ in par-
ticular, cry out for definition. Early on, the courts abandoned the plain language of the 
statute . . . .”). See generally Isabelle R. McAndrews, The On-Sale Bar After Pfaff v. Wells Elec-
tronics: Toward a Bright-Line Rule, 81 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 155 (1999) (discuss-
ing the development of the on-sale bar). 
157 McAndrews, supra note 156, at 157. 
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quirement of reduction to practice.158 This test met with criticism from 
the Federal Circuit, however, on the grounds that the continued tech-
nical requirement of reduction to practice was too restrictive and could 
allow an inventor to commercially exploit an innovation beyond the 
statutory period and nevertheless receive a patent.159 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in the 1987 decision UMC Electronics v. 
United States, explicitly eliminated the reduction to practice require-
ment and instead held that all circumstances surrounding the sale or 
offer to sell should be taken into account and weighed against the on-
sale bar’s underlying policies.160 The court found the fact that the in-
vention was substantially embodied sufficient to invoke the on-sale bar, 
even though the invention was not complete.161 
 The current standard for the on-sale bar is governed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1998 decision, Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., which held 
that for the on-sale bar to apply, an invention must be the subject of a 
commercial offer for sale and ready for patenting.162 In Pfaff, the Court 
considered whether a purchase order of a new computer-chip socket 
invoked the on-sale bar.163 Although the purchase order was placed, the 
invention at issue had not yet been reduced to practice.164 Rather, the 
purchase was placed based on a sketch of the inventor’s concept.165 
The Court reasoned that the on-sale bar is invoked not only when the 
invention is reduced to practice or “substantially complete,” but also 
when the invention is “ready for patenting,” either by reduction to 
practice or description that would have enabled a person skilled in the 
art to practice the invention.166 
                                                                                                                      
158 Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302 (2d Cir. 1995); McAndrews, supra 
note 156, at 157–58. 
159 McAndrews, supra note 156, at 158; see Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik v. Murata 
Mach. Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
160 UMC Elecs. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
161 Id. at 657. The court reasoned that although not fully reduced to practice at the 
time of sale, much of the invention was embodied in a prototype, including the novel ele-
ment, which had been tested and proved suitable for the device’s intended purpose. Id. 
Devices including every other element were available in the prior art. Id. 
162 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). Note, however, that it is unclear 
whether the on-sale bar will have the same breadth under new section 102(a)(1). See infra 
note 202 and accompanying text. Specifically, it is not clear whether, given the addition of 
“otherwise available to the public,” on-sale activity will need to be public to trigger the on-
sale bar. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
163 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 57–60. 
164 Id. at 58. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 63–67. 
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 The Supreme Court emphasized that the Pfaff standard found sup-
port in the policies underlying the on-sale bar.167 Quoting a statement 
from Judge Hand’s opinion in Metallizing—that an inventor’s right to a 
patent is conditioned upon his not commercially exploiting his inven-
tion before seeking a patent168—the Court ruled that the purchase or-
der based on the inventor’s concept sketch invoked the on-sale bar.169 
II. Interpretive Clues from the Retained Statutory Bars  
and Legislative History 
 The development of the retained statutory bars and the legislative 
history of the America Invents Act help inform the appropriate stan-
dards for “otherwise available to the public.”170 Section A of this Part 
draws insight from the retained statutory bars and demonstrates that 
each bar has been interpreted expansively to effectuate its underlying 
policy.171 Section B then examines the origins and language of “other-
wise available,” and demonstrates that Congress added the category to 
create an overall public accessibility requirement.172 Finally, Section C 
looks to the legislative history of “otherwise available,” and demon-
strates that the drafters of the America Invents Act intended the new 
category to complement the printed publication bar.173 
A. Insights from the Development of the Retained Statutory Bars 
 Each category of prior art retained from the old section 102(b) 
has been interpreted broadly to give effect to its underlying policies.174 
The public use and on-sale bars aim to encourage prompt disclosure, 
prevent detrimental public reliance, and force inventors to choose be-
tween a patent and trade secrecy, while allowing them a reasonable 
time to pursue patenting.175 To prevent detrimental public reliance, 
the public use bar has come to cover uses that few would call “public” 
                                                                                                                      
167 Id. at 68. 
168 Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520 (“[I]t is a condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent 
that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must 
content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.”). 
169 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68–69. 
170 See infra notes 174–221 and accompanying text. 
171 See infra notes 174–190 and accompanying text. 
172 See infra notes 191–207 and accompanying text. 
173 See infra notes 208–221 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra notes 62–169 and accompanying text. 
175 See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra 
note 133, at 33–34; Barrett, supra note 133, at 732–33. 
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in the ordinary sense of the word.176 The bar essentially prohibits all 
uses that are “non-secret.”177 In addition, the public use bar forces in-
ventors to choose between secrecy and patent protection because, un-
der pre-America Invents Act case law, the bar encompasses wholly se-
cret commercial uses of an invention.178 Likewise, the on-sale bar de-
feats patentability if an invention is subject to a single offer for sale and 
is ready for patenting, even if it has not been reduced to practice.179 
hat is it 
ow
                             
 Nowhere, however, has the dominance of policy been more evi-
dent than in the development of the printed publication bar.180 In or-
der to prevent withdrawal of inventions already in the public do-
main,181 courts have eschewed a plain meaning interpretation of the 
printed publication bar and have instead developed the interpretation 
to keep pace with new methods for making information accessible to 
the public.182 Perhaps this is why in the late 1970s and 1980s the law of 
printed publications was referred to as a “muddled mess”183 and in-
spired journal articles with titles like Printed Publication: W
N ?184 
 The rigid “printing” and “publication” restrictions that existed pri-
or to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ 1981 decision in In re 
Wyer reflected the realities of information dissemination during the ear-
ly years of the bar.185 When the phrase printed publication entered the 
patent statutes in 1836, and even when the currently controlling stat-
utes were written in the early 1950s, traditional printing methods were 
                                                                                         
llizing Eng’g Co. v. 
Ken F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 § 6.02[5]. 
ying text. 
ation emerged, courts wrestled with the bound-
arie
ation?” If Not, Do You Have Evidence of Prior 
“Kn
hite, supra note 83, at 42. 
.N.Y. 1966). 
176 See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336–37 (1881); Meta
yon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 
177 See Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336–37; Chisum, supra note 50,
178 See Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520. 
179 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). 
180 See supra notes 62–127 and accompan
181 E.g., Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In 
re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
182 See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The statutory phrase ‘printed 
publication’ has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing advances in the technologies of 
data storage, retrieval, and dissemination.”); Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 249–58 (not-
ing “[a]s new technologies for mass public
s of the definition of the word ‘printed’” and with tracing interpretive changes in re-
sponse to major technological advances). 
183 Gerald Rose, Do You Have a “Printed Public
owledge or Use?”, 61 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 643, 644 (1979). 
184 Rothschild & W
185 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 
742 (S.D
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the only ways to ensure the wide dissemination of information.186 By 
the time the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals adopted a unitary 
approach to the term printed publication in the 1980s, the technology 
of document duplication, data storage, and data-retrieval systems had 
advanced such that the probability that a prior art reference would 
reach the public had little to do with whether it was “printed” in the 
d the public accessibility standard eventually 
led to their inclusion.190 
                                                                                                                     
typical sense of the word.187 
 The modern focus on public accessibility as the touchstone of the 
printed publication bar has allowed the bar to capture references that, 
although not actually “printed,” have nevertheless made the invention 
sufficiently available to the public interested in the art such that it 
could be said to be in the public’s possession.188 For example, early ac-
ceptance of typewritten pieces as printed publications in the 1930s re-
flected a perception that improvements in indexing, transportation, or 
dissemination had made university library materials, including those 
that were typewritten, as accessible to the public as documents printed 
by press had been in 1836.189 Similarly, although courts were initially 
reluctant to allow microfilm documents to constitute printed publica-
tions because they were not “printed” in the strict sense of the word, 
courts’ gravitation towar
B. Addition of the “Otherwise Available to the Public” Language 
 The “otherwise available to the public” language appears to origi-
nate from an earlier proposed version of the America Invents Act.191 In 
the original version of the legislation, introduced by Congressman La-
mar Smith, section 102(a)(1) included only three categories of prior 
 
186 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; I.C.E., 250 F. Supp. at 742; Herbster, supra note 70, at 
49–5
5, 1352 
(Fed
 (6th Cir. 1940); Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252, 253 (Pat. & Tr. Off. Bd. App. 
1937
.2d at 226–27; In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 622 (C.C.P.A. 1958); 
I.C.E
 1, § 107, at 90; see Patent Reform 
Act  Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2005). 
0. 
187 In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; I.C.E., 250 F. Supp. at 742; Herbster, supra note 70, at 50. 
188 Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 27 (“The courts have interpreted [the printed publication] 
category expansively to address publicly available information, even when the information 
has not been ‘printed’ or formally ‘published.’”); see, e.g., In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1315–
16 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (searchable Internet databases); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 134
. Cir. 2004) (printed display of slides); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (microfilm). 
189 Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 250; see Hamilton Labs., Inc. v. Massengill, 111 F.2d 
584, 585
). 
190 See In re Wyer, 655 F
., 250 F. Supp. at 743. 
191 Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 26; Wegner, supra note
of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th
1556 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1533 
art.192 The section retained two categories from the old Patent Act— 
patented inventions and inventions described in a printed publication— 
but eliminated the on sale and public use categories.193 Instead, the 
proposed section replaced those categories with the category of inven-
tions “otherwise publicly known.”194 The proposed act defined subject 
matter “publicly known” as subject matter “reasonably and effectively 
accessible through its use, sale, or disclosure by other means.”195 Fur-
thermore, accessibility required that persons of ordinary skill in the art 
ere
“otherwise publicly known” became “otherwise available to the pub-
                                                                                                                     
w  able to gain access to and comprehend the content of the subject 
matter without undue effort.196 
 This substitution of “publically known” for “on sale” and “public 
use” would have would have had the effect of limiting the uses and sales 
that constitute prior art more than previous case law.197 Under previous 
case law, an inventor who uses his invention privately and in secret may 
nevertheless be denied a patent under the public use bar if the invented 
product was sold freely to the public.198 Similarly, an invention that is 
privately sold may be barred from patenting under the on-sale bar, even 
if the sale would fail to make the invention “publicly known.”199 Replac-
ing the public use and on-sale bars with “otherwise publicly known” 
would have eliminated these types of “secret prior art.”200 After negotia-
tions that took place off the legislative record, however, the well-known 
public use and on sale categories were placed back in the section, and 
 
. 2795 § 3(b)(1). 
0 (holding that an inventor who used a secret 
proc
faff, 525 U.S. at 67 (holding that the on-sale bar applies where an inven-
tion
pra note 1, § 155, at 118–19; see H.R. 2795 § 3(b)(1). 
192 H.R
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 26; Wegner, supra note 1, § 155, at 118–19; see H.R. 2795 
§ 3(b)(1). 
198 See, e.g., Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 52
ess more than one year before filing a patent application forfeited the right to a pat-
ent by commercially exploiting the invention); supra notes 148–152 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Metallizing doctrine). 
199 See, e.g., P
 is ready for patenting and is the subject of a commercial offer for sale, even if it has 
not been reduced to practice); supra notes 162–169 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Pfaff standard). 
200 Ammon Lesher, The New Grace Period Under the America Invents Act, in Patents in 
the 21st Century: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 1, at 11, 12; 
Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 26; Wegner, su
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lic.”201 Scholars have used statements in the legislative history to specu-
late that the “otherwise available” language will nevertheless serve to 
mit
 the public” or “unless the invention is unavail-
able to the public.”207 
li  the public use and on-sale bars.202 
 Regardless of the disposition of that issue, there seems to be little 
question that “otherwise available” does create a new category of prior 
art.203 Examining the language and structure of section 102(a)(1) dic-
tates this result.204 This section provides, “A person shall be entitled to a 
patent unless . . . the claimed invention was patented, described in a 
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to 
the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”205 
The second “or,” which separates “public use” and “on sale” from “oth-
erwise available to the public,” indicates that “otherwise available” is an 
entirely separate category from the previously specified types of prior 
art.206 If “otherwise available to the public” was only intended to limit 
the public use and on sale categories, the section’s drafters could have 
made this clear by choosing different language such as “providing the 
invention is available to
C. Legislative History of the America Invents Act 
 The legislative history of the America Invents Act provides few 
clues as to what, if any, additional references the Act’s drafters intended 
to be captured by the “otherwise available to the public” language.208 
                                                                                                                      
201 Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 26; see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 10
issue for the PTO and the Federal Circuit to work out, it is beyond the scope of 
this
g a new category of prior art—
‘oth
rnoff, supra note 7, at 26; see Leahy-Smith America 
Inve
ff, supra note 7, at 26; see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), 
§ 10
 supra note 6, at 33; see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), 
§ 10
 Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 Cong. 
Rec. t of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
2(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 2013). 
202 See Morgan, supra note 6, at 30–33, 38–42; Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 25–26; Wegner, 
supra note 1, § 157, at 120–22, §§ 232–35, at 136–43. Although this will be a tremendously 
important 
 Note. 
203 See, e.g., Bui, supra note 6, at 471; Lesher, supra note 200, at 12; Sarnoff, supra note 
7, at 26 (“But whatever the intent in regard to the existing categories of ‘public use’ or ‘on-
sale,’ the new statutory language must be viewed as creatin
erwise available.’”); Wegner, supra note 1, § 120, at 99. 
204 Morgan, supra note 6, at 33; Sa
nts Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1). 
205 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1). 
206 Sarno
2(a)(1). 
207 Morgan,
2(a)(1). 
208 See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 43 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 73; 
157 Cong. Rec. S1370–71 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of
 S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statemen
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According to the House Report accompanying the final version of the 
House bill, “the phrase ‘available to the public’ was added to clarify the 
broad scope of relevant prior art.”209 Where the “otherwise available” 
language is discussed elsewhere in the legislative history, the focus is on 
the bill sponsors’ intent to impose an overarching requirement of pub-
c a
o the proposed Act.213 Addressing a ques-
tion re,” 
and the 
inve
means the same thing as “publicly accessible” does in the context of a 
                                                                                                                     
li vailability on all non-patent prior art.210 Nowhere in the legislative 
history do the sponsors provide examples of the additional matter to be 
captured by the catchall category.211 
 Although the legislative history is silent on what qualifies as “other-
wise available to the public,” the statements of one of the bill’s contribu-
tors do offer some insight into the drafters’ general understanding of 
“available to the public.”212 On March 1, 2011, Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee member and co-sponsor of the Senate-passed bill Jon Kyl dis-
cussed several issues related t
 about then-proposed section 102(b)’s use of the word “disclosu
whether the word would cover public use or sale activities of 
ntor, Senator Kyl stated: 
[A] disclosure is something that makes the invention available 
to the public—the same test applied by section 102(a) to de-
fine the scope of relevant prior art. And “available to the public” 
 
209 See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 43. 
210 See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S5431 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) 
(“When the committee included the words ‘or otherwise available to the public’ in section 
102(a), the word ‘otherwise’ made clear that the preceding items are things that are of the 
same quality or nature. As a result . . . public uses and sales are prior art only if they make 
the invention available to the public.”); 157 Cong. Rec. H4429 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Lamar Smith) (stating that “in order to trigger the bar in the new 
102(a) in our legislation, an action must make the patented subject matter ‘available to the 
public’ before the effective filing date”); 157 Cong. Rec. S1496 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (discussing legislative intent that “otherwise available to 
the public” impose public availability requirement on public use and on-sale bars in new 
section 102(a)(1)). 
211 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98; 157 Cong. Rec. S5431(daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 Cong. Rec. H4429 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Lamar Smith); 157 Cong. Rec. S1496 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (statement of Sen. Pat-
rick Leahy). 
212 157 Cong. Rec. S1370–71 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 
Cong. Rec. S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
213 157 Cong. Rec. S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (discussing 
Gene Quinn, Senate to Vote on Patent Reform, First to File Fight Looms, IPWatchdog.com (Feb. 
27, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/02/27/senate-vote-patent-reform-
first-to-file-fight-looms/id=15566/); see America Invents Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. (as passed by 
Senate, Mar. 8, 2011). 
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publication. Subject matter makes an invention publicly acces-
sible or available if an interested person who is skilled in the 
essible, 
ut 
eliminates the use of the definition of prior art 
 p
the drafters’ perspective, the “otherwise available to the public” cate-
     
field could, through reasonable diligence, find the subject 
matter and understand the invention from it.214 
 Senator Kyl reiterated this understanding of “available to the pub-
lic” on the Senate floor on March 8, 2011, in the discussions preceding 
the vote on the Senate-passed bill.215 Kyl stated that whether an inven-
tion has been made available to the public is the same inquiry taken 
under existing law to determine if a document is publicly acc
“b is conducted in a more generalized manner to account for disclo-
sures of information that are not in the form of documents.”216 
 Senator Kyl also emphasized that this “available to the public” 
standard aims to prevent inventors from withdrawing inventions al-
ready in the public domain.217 While discussing the drafters’ intent to 
impose an overarching public availability standard on all forms of prior 
art in new section 102(a), Kyl stated that the new section serves only 
that one purpose, and “
to ursue varied goals such as encouraging prompt filing or limiting 
commercialization.”218 
 Co-sponsor Senator Kyl’s statements appear to confirm that, from 
                                                                                                                 
214 157 Cong. Rec. S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (empha-
sis added). Although Senator Kyl appears to be the only senator to reflect on the meaning 
of “available to the public,” co-sponsor Senator Patrick Leahy praised Kyl’s contributions to 
the bill immediately after Kyl made this statement. 157 Cong. Rec. S1044 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 
2011) said: 
s the hundreds of hours 
e bill. 157 Cong. Rec. S949 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Pat-
rick
11) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 10
ec. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
t 1371. 
 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). At the conclusion of Kyl’s statements, Leahy 
Mr. President, the Senator has been involved in this right from the beginning. 
We have worked at having a bill that would be in the best interests of the Sen-
ate under both Republicans and Democrats across the political spectrum. We 
have worked very closely together . . . . I compliment the Senator from Ari-
zona for the way he has worked in his constant efforts in the committee, the 
public meetings, but that is the tip of the iceberg; it i
of behind-the-scenes working to reach where we are. 
Id. On another occasion, Senator Leahy described Senator Kyl as having had “tremendous 
input” into th
 Leahy). 
215 157 Cong. Rec. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). Section 
102(a)(1) of the Senate-passed bill, Senate Bill 23, is identical to section 102(a)(1) of the 
enacted legislation. Compare Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (20
2(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 2013), with S. 23 § 2(b). 
216 157 Cong. R
217 Id. a
218 Id. 
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gory shares a policy rationale with the printed publication category.219 
Preventing inventors from withdrawing inventions that are already in 
the public domain is the express policy underlying the printed publica-
tion bar.220 Indeed, when announcing this policy, Kyl cited Bruckelmyer 
v. Ground Heaters, Inc. and SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Sys-
tems, Inc., two cases interpreting the printed publication bar.221 
III. A Proposal for I herwise Available  
prior art under old section 102, will 
 c
                                                                                                                     
nterpreting “Ot
to the Public” 
 The proper contours of new section 102(a)(1)’s “otherwise avail-
able to the public” prior art category is a consequential issue for patent 
seekers and their counselors.222 Beginning on March 16, 2013, all sub-
sequently filed patents will be evaluated by the PTO under the new sec-
tion 102.223 Furthermore, new section 102 will control in later litigation 
concerning the validity of those patents filed after March 16, 2013.224 As 
a result, inventors deciding whether to pursue a patent will need to pre-
dict whether a reference, even if not 
be aptured by this new category.225 
 Section A of this Part argues that, based on the apparent policy 
behind the “otherwise available to the public” category, the PTO and 
the courts should view the category’s addition as an invitation to extend 
standards developed under the printed publication bar to non-doc-
umentary references.226 Section B provides examples of new forms of 
references that could immediately constitute prior art under this inter-
pretation, and demonstrates the ease with which courts could apply 
printed publication standards to judge their sufficiency.227 Finally, Sec-
 
219 See id.; supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
220 E.g., Bruckelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; supra notes 64–65 and 
accompanying text. 
221 157 Cong. Rec. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); see SRI 
Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bruckelmyer, 445 
F.3d at 1378. 
222 Morgan, supra note 6, at 29; see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 2013); Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 12–13 (stating that the “oth-
erwise available” category “may generate years of needless litigation to re-settle the cur-
rently well-understood boundaries of the public domain”). 
223 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(n); Morgan, supra note 6, at 29. 
224 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102; Dixon, supra note 1, at 4; 
Morgan, supra note 6, at 29. 
225 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1). 
226 See infra notes 229–251 and accompanying text. 
227 See infra notes 252–279 and accompanying text. 
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tion C argues that the most meaningful addition made by “otherwise 
available” lies in the category’s ability to capture unanticipated tech-
nologies and new norms of disseminating information.228 
A. The “Otherw ing Standards 
is policy in mind when adding the phrase “available to 
e p
on bar 
                                                                                                                     
ise Available” Category Should Incorporate Exist
Developed Under Printed Publication Case Law 
 The plain language “available to the public” and the legislative his-
tory of section 102(a)(1) suggest that the “otherwise available” bar and 
the printed publication bar share an underlying policy justification.229 
The printed publication bar aims to prevent inventors from removing 
from the public, through a patent’s grant of exclusive rights, knowledge 
that is already available to all.230 The “otherwise available” category ap-
pears especially tailored to effectuate this policy.231 Co-sponsor Senator 
Jon Kyl’s statements in the legislative history further confirm that the 
drafters had th
th ublic.”232 
 The PTO and the courts should receive the new statutory lan-
guage as an opportunity to extend the standards developed under the 
printed publication case law to disclosures of information that are in 
non-documentary, non-printed form.233 The policy rationales behind 
the retained statutory bars have been paramount in developing their 
standards.234 A shared policy indicates that the printed publicati
and the “otherwise available” bar should also share standards.235 
 Extending existing printed publication standards to “otherwise 
available” would be beneficial in several respects.236 Most importantly, 
 
228 See infra notes 280–305 and accompanying text. 
229 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); 157 Cong. Rec. S1371 
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); supra notes 191–221 and accompanying 
text. 
230 E.g., Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In 
re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 
1981); see supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
231 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1). Notably, the Fed-
eral Circuit has frequently used the language “disseminated or otherwise made available” 
when elucidating the concept of public accessibility. See, e.g., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Brucklelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378; In re 
Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226. 
232 See 157 Cong. Rec. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); supra 
notes 212–221 and accompanying text. 
233 See infra notes 237–305 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 62–169 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 62–169 and accompanying text. 
236 See infra notes 237–242 and accompanying text. 
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this interpretation would allow the PTO and courts to rely on standards 
that have been developed over decades, representing a careful balance 
of barring from exclusivity those inventions thought to be in the pub-
lic’s possession, while affording the incentive of a patent to those that 
are not.237 This interpretation would also provide the immediate bene-
fit of a smooth transition from old section 102(a) to new section 
102(a)(1) by allowing courts and patent seekers to look to well-
established standards to determine the boundaries of “otherwise avail-
able” art.238 This interpretation would thereby limit the amount of liti-
gation necessary to settle the contours of the new category, and would 
result in a shorter period of uncertainty for the patent system.239 Fur-
ther, this interpretation would give new section 102(a)(1) internal con-
sistency.240 It would be difficult to justify diverging standards for public 
accessibility under printed publication and public availability under 
“otherwise available.”241 Finally, extending the public accessibility stan-
dard to the “otherwise available” category would be consistent with the 
pa
and indexed may help courts determine whether a non-documentary 
                                                                                                                     
ap rent legislative intent of the new provision.242 
 The question under the “otherwise available” bar should be 
whether the reference is accessible such that persons interested and 
ordinarily skilled in the art, exercising reasonable diligence, could lo-
cate and comprehend the essentials of the claimed invention without 
need for future research or experimentation.243 This is the same in-
quiry undertaken under the printed publication bar.244 Also, as under 
the printed publication bar, whether a reference has been distributed 
 
237 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 
at 226. 
238 See Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 27 (predicting the boundaries of “otherwise available” 
will only be solved after years of “unnecessary and (for patent challengers) often unsuc-
cessful litigation”). 
239 See id. 
240 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 
2013). 
241 See id. 
242 See 157 Cong. Rec. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 
Cong. Rec. S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); supra notes 212–216 
and accompanying text. 
243 See Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re 
Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1160; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; 157 Cong. Rec. S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 
1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
244 See, e.g., Bruckelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; supra notes 83–107 
and accompanying text. 
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reference is accessible.245 In appropriate circumstances, where informa-
tion has not been distributed or indexed, the four factors elucidated by 
the Federal Circuit in the 2004 case, In re Klopfenstein, may be helpful in 
resolving the question of public accessibility.246 
 The “otherwise available” category could also be seen as correc-
tive.247 The addition of this category, in part, fills a gap in the statute 
that has already been filled by decades of printed publication case 
law.248 These cases expanded the printed publication bar to encompass 
references that were an uneasy fit for the printed publication category, 
but whose inclusion in the section 102 statutory bars was necessary to 
effectuate the underlying policies.249 Ever since courts began interpret-
ing the statutory term “printed” to mean “probability of dissemination,” 
doctrinal tensions have existed in the printed publication case law.250 
Had the “otherwise available to the public” category been present in 
the 1952 Patent Act, the printed publication category would not have 
needed to be interpreted so broadly to catch typewritten pieces, micro-
                                                                                                                      
245 See, e.g., SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350; In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985); infra notes 270–278 
and accompanying text. 
246 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350; supra notes 100–107 and accompanying text. 
In considering whether a temporary display of slides was a printed publication, the Federal 
Circuit looked to the following factors: (1) the length of time the display was exhibited, (2) 
the expertise of the target audience, (3) the existence (or lack thereof) of reasonable ex-
pectations that the material displayed would not be copied, and (4) the simplicity or ease 
with which the material displayed could have been copied. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 
1350. 
247 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 
2013); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226. 
248 See, e.g., In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252, 253 (Pat. 
& Tr. Off. Bd. App. 1937). 
249 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352 (finding a display of slides affixed to 
poster board at a scientific conference to be a printed publication); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 
226 (microfilm); Grayzel v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 466, 478 (D.N.J. 2004), 
aff’d, 162 F. App’x 954 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (videotape); Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 253 (typewrit-
ten document). 
250 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (“Given the state of technology in document duplica-
tion, data storage, and data-retrieval systems, the ‘probability of dissemination’ of an item 
very often has little to do with whether or not it is ‘printed’ in the sense of that word when 
it was introduced into the patent statutes in 1836.”); Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 249 
(“As new technologies for mass publication emerged, courts wrestled with the boundaries 
of the definition of the word ‘printed.’”). 
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films, displays of slides, and other references the courts determined 
were within the public’s possession.251 
B. Possible New Matter Added Immediately by “Otherwise Available” 
 The “otherwise available” category has already received criticism on 
the grounds that it appears unnecessary in light of the broad and ex-
pansive interpretation of the printed publication bar.252 As one com-
mentator stated, “It is difficult to imagine how an invention would be 
‘otherwise available to the public’ when it would not also be a ‘printed publi-
cation’ within the meaning of case law.”253 Although, as noted above, 
the printed publication case law has already done some of the work of 
“otherwise available,”254 it does not necessarily follow that the bar will be 
completely duplicative.255 This is so even if the category incorporates 
standards developed under the printed publication bar.256 
 The “otherwise available” bar will allow courts to focus on public 
accessibility for non-documentary references, free from the limitations 
of the term “printed.”257 In In re Klopfenstein, the Federal Circuit held 
that a printed slide presentation displayed at a scientific conference was 
a printed publication but noted in dicta that an entirely oral presenta-
tion that included neither slides nor copies of the presentation was 
“without question not a ‘printed publication’” under the old section 
102(b).258 Despite recognizing that public accessibility is the key in-
quiry in the printed publication analysis, the court still believed the 
reach of the printed publication bar to be limited to references that 
                                                                                                                      
251 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352 (display of slides affixed to poster board); 
In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (microfilm); Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (videotape); Gullik-
sen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 253 (typewritten document). 
252 See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 27 (“Given the broad interpretation that has been 
given to ‘printed publication,’ . . . the new category of ‘otherwise available to the public’ 
seems wholly unnecessary, unless it is based on either different policies or on a different 
scope of application than is reflected in the ‘printed publication’ case law.”); Wegner, supra 
note 1, § 120, at 99 (“Almost any invention that is widely disseminated in a tangible form 
to workers skilled in the art without secrecy restriction constitutes prior art as a ‘printed 
publication’. It is difficult to imagine how an invention would be ‘otherwise available to the 
public’ when it would not also be a ‘printed publication’ within the meaning of case law.”). 
253 Wegner, supra note 1, § 120, at 99. 
254 See supra notes 247–251 and accompanying text. 
255 See infra notes 257–279 and accompanying text. 
256 See infra notes 257–279 and accompanying text. 
257 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 
2013); infra notes 258–279 and accompanying text. 
258 In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1349 n.4, 1352. 
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were printed in one form or another.259 Were this not so, it would be 
difficult to justify the court’s unqualified conclusion.260 
                                                                                                                     
 Just as the printed publication determination rests on a case-
specific inquiry into a document’s public accessibility, so too should the 
“otherwise available” determination; courts need not adopt a blanket 
rule that a purely oral presentation is always prior art under “otherwise 
available.”261 Under certain circumstances, however, a purely oral pres-
entation should certainly constitute a patent-invalidating piece of “oth-
erwise available” art.262 Instead of displaying his printed slides at the 
conference, suppose the inventor in In re Klopfenstein set up a booth 
where, for the same two and one-half days, he repeated an entirely oral 
presentation of the same information with such speed and clarity that 
his expert audience could easily take notes and understand all the ele-
ments of his invention.263 In this situation, the information surely en-
tered in the public’s possession even though presented orally.264 
 The factors the Federal Circuit used to analyze In re Klopfenstein’s 
actual fact pattern could be applied to an oral presentation with little 
modification.265 In the above situation, the length of time the informa-
tion was displayed, or in this case spoken, would be equivalent to that in 
the In re Klopfenstein case.266 The expertise of the target audience would 
be unchanged, as would the lack of reasonable expectations that the 
material displayed would not be copied.267 Perhaps it would be more 
burdensome to take notes during the oral presentations because the 
speaker would dictate the pace, but only marginally so.268 Even in a less 
analogous fact pattern, it would be well within the competence of the 
PTO and the courts to weigh these factors as the Federal Circuit in-
structed in In re Klopfenstein.269 
 
259 See id. at 1348, 1349 n.4. 
260 See id. 
261 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); In re Klopfenstein, 
380 F.3d 1350; In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1161; In re Hall, 781 F.2d 899. 
262 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); infra notes 263–269 
and accompanying text. 
263 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1347. 
264 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); In re Klopfenstein, 
380 F.3d at 1347. 
265 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350; supra notes 100–107 and accompanying text. 
266 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1350–51. 
267 See id. at 1351. 
268 See id. at 1351–52. It would be especially easy to take notes if the presentation was 
primarily made up of information that was already widely known among those skilled in 
the art, as were the slides in In re Klopfenstein. See id. 
269 See id. at 1350. 
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 Distribution and indexing can similarly be clues, as they are under 
the printed publication bar, to the public accessibility of other types of 
references under “otherwise available.”270 Although courts have split on 
whether a videotape can constitute a printed publication, this disagree-
ment, again, appears to rest on the limitation imposed by the word 
“printed.”271 If, however, a videotape or similar reference, such as a 
sound recording, DVD, or video recording placed on the Internet, were 
freed of the “printed” limitation and analyzed under “otherwise avail-
able,” there is no reason it could not constitute prior art in appropriate 
circumstances.272 The analysis would continue to be a fact-specific in-
quiry into the reference’s accessibility.273 Under this methodology, a 
copy of a videotape retained in a corporation’s private, restricted-access 
library would be no more publicly accessible than a document main-
tained under similar circumstances, and neither reference would be 
considered prior art.274 It is equally true, however, that if it was appro-
priately indexed in a public library, a videotape could constitute “other-
wise available” prior art just as a document retained under those condi-
tions constitutes a printed publication.275 
 In this respect, the “otherwise available” category may also have 
the benefit of increasing predictability and consistency within the lower 
courts.276 Some courts have been more willing than others to stretch 
the definition of printed publication beyond traditionally “printed” 
                                                                                                                      
270 See SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1197; In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350; In re Hall, 781 F.2d 
at 899–900; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 774 F.2d at 1109. 
271 Compare Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78 (finding videotape to constitute a print-
ed publication), with Diomed, Inc. v. Angiodynamics, 450 F. Supp. 2d 130, 141–42 (D. 
Mass. 2006) (rejecting contention that a video may qualify as prior art, reasoning “[t]he 
definition of ‘printed’ cannot be stretched to include a presentation which does not in-
clude a paper component or, at a minimum, a substitute for paper such as the static pres-
entation of slides”). 
272 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 
2013); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350. 
273 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350; In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1161; In re Hall, 781 
F.2d at 899. 
274 See N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 936–37 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (find-
ing documents housed in corporation’s library, with access restricted to authorized per-
sons, were not printed publications). 
275 Cf. In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 899–90 (finding a single thesis indexed in a library’s spe-
cial dissertations catalogue to be a printed publication). 
276 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); Diomed, 450 F. 
Supp. 2d at 141–42; Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78; infra notes 277–279 and accompa-
nying text. 
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forms.277 Whether a videotape or similar reference may constitute a 
patent-invalidating reference should not depend on the happenstance 
of court assignment.278 Using standards developed under the printed 
publication case law, the “otherwise available” category will allow courts 
to focus solely on the question of availability to the interested public, 
and thereby will make these types of issues easier to resolve.279 
                                                                                                                     
C. Potential for Reaching Unanticipated Technologies and New Norms for 
Disseminating Information 
 Although the additions of references such as oral presentations, 
video recordings, and sound recordings may seem somewhat trivial,280 
the “otherwise available to the public” category of prior art could take 
on more content over time, just as the printed publication bar did.281 
The most meaningful addition by the category may lie in its potential 
for capturing unanticipated new technology and new norms for dis-
seminating information.282 
 The development of the printed publication bar, especially in the 
period leading up to the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ 
1981 decision in In re Wyer, demonstrates that the development of new 
technologies can drastically outpace patent reform.283 The interval be-
tween the passage of the Patent Act of 1870 and the 1952 statute 
 
277 Compare Diomed, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 141–42 (rejecting out of hand the argument that 
a video recording could constitute a printed publication), with Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 
478 (finding a video recording to be a printed publication). 
278 See Diomed, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 141–42; Grayzel, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
279 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); supra notes 261–275 
and accompanying text. 
280 See Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 27 (arguing “otherwise available” will invite needless lit-
igation “to establish what are highly likely to be very limited expansions of the public do-
main”). 
281 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (rejecting the traditional dichotomy between “print-
ing” and “publication” in favor of a unitary “printed publication” standard because, due to 
advances in technology, “the ‘probability of dissemination’ of an item very often has little 
to do with whether or not it is ‘printed’ in the sense of that word when it was introduced 
into the patent statutes in 1836”); I.C.E. Corp v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 742–
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (interpreting the statutory concept of “printed publication” to include 
not only documents “printed” using traditional printing methods, but also by “modern 
day” methods providing they could be located by and would enable a person interested 
and ordinarily skilled in the art); Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 249–57 (describing the 
development of the printed publication bar in response to new technologies for mass pub-
lication). 
282 See infra notes 283–305 and accompanying text. 
283 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; I.C.E., 250 F. Supp. at 742; Oppenheimer, supra note 
69, at 249–57. 
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brought significant new means for disseminating information.284 Courts 
struggle with whether or not microfilm could constitute a printed publi-
cation demonstrates the tensions that arise when the underlying policies 
and plain language of prior art categories are at odds.285 Similarly, the 
way information was disseminated in 1952, when the last major revision 
to the patent system took place, looked drastically different than how 
information is currently shared.286 The only way the statutory bars have 
been able to reach these modern references has been through the lib-
eral, non-textual interpretation of the printed publication bar.287 
 At the same time, it could be said that most technological changes 
up to now have resulted in relatively easy cases.288 The typewritten doc-
uments, microfilms, and printed slides that the courts have been forced 
to consider have all involved the written word displayed in a static me-
dium.289 Whether new technologies for sharing information fit into this 
line of innovations or not, the “otherwise available” category will allow 
courts to concentrate their analysis on the availability of the informa-
tion to the public interested in the art.290 
 The “otherwise available” category may also allow courts to re-
spond to new norms for sharing information.291 Returning to the hypo-
thetical posed in In re Klopfenstein,292 suppose an entirely oral presenta-
tion that fully disclosed a new invention was presented not to a group 
of experts, but to a group of undergraduates who would not be able to 
comprehend the essentials of the invention without further research or 
                                                                                                                      
284 See Gulliksen, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 253–54. 
285 See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 225–26; In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624–27 (C.C.P.A. 
1958). 
286 See, e.g., Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & Elecs. Indus., Inc., 450 
F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1971) (“Since the [1958] decision in Tenney, there have been revo-
lutionary developments in techniques for reproduction, printing and dissemination of 
documents and data.”); Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 230–31 (“In 1980, a researcher 
looking for public information would have relied principally on books and magazines in a 
library; in 2002, the researcher will rely primarily on electronic sources . . . .”). 
287 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226; Grayzel, 345 F. 
Supp. 2d at 478; Oppenheimer, supra note 69, at 249–57 (describing development of 
printed publication bar in response to new technologies for mass publication). 
288 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352; Hamilton Labs., Inc. v. Massengill, 111 
F.2d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 1940); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226. 
289 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352 (printed slides); Hamilton Labs., 111 F.2d 
at 585 (typewritten document); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (microfilm). 
290 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 
2013); infra notes 293–301 and accompanying text. 
291 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); infra notes 292–305 
and accompanying text. 
292 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1349 n.4. 
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experimentation.293 Of course, under standards extended from the 
printed publication case law, this would not constitute an invalidating 
“otherwise available” art.294 If, however, the presentation was recorded 
and placed on the hosting university’s website where viewers could 
pause, rewind, and repeat the recording, a court could analyze the case 
under the printed publication case law related to indexing, to deter-
mine whether the interested public could locate the video,295 and also 
under the In re Klopfenstein factors.296 
 Resolution of harder cases may rest on a thorough technological 
inquiry.297 A more difficult case would arise, for example, if the hypo-
thetical conference was not recorded, but was instead broadcast over a 
live Internet stream.298 In this case, a court may take note of whether 
the stream was password protected, which would speak to the level of 
public accessibility.299 The ultimate disposition of such a case, however, 
could rest on, for example, the court’s recognition of the widespread 
use of computer programs designed to record live Internet streams.300 
Just as it has never been necessary to demonstrate that a printed publi-
cation was in fact viewed by anyone, it would not be necessary to show 
that anyone actually recorded the stream.301 
  Considering the hypotheticals explored above, it is clear that the 
“otherwise available” category adds real value to the section 102 statu-
                                                                                                                      
293 See id. at 1347. 
294 See Cordis Corp., 561 F.3d at 1333; In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1160; In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 
at 226. 
295 See, e.g., SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1197; In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350; In re Hall, 781 
F.2d at 899–900; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 774 F.2d at 1109. 
296 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350; supra notes 100–107 and accompanying text. 
297 See infra notes 298–301 and accompanying text. 
298 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1347. 
299 See N. Telecom, 908 F.2d at 936–37 (finding documents retained in a corporation’s 
access-restricted library not publicly accessible). 
300 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350–52. Looking at this hypothetical through the 
In re Klopfenstein factors, one might say that the ability to record an Internet stream makes 
the “length of time” factor essentially irrelevant, while greatly increasing the simplicity or 
ease with which the information could be copied. See id. Given that viewers would be 
watching the stream in the privacy of their homes or offices, a court might determine that 
there was no reasonable expectation that the material would not be copied. See id. at 1351. 
If a court applied the Klopfenstein factors in this way, it could easily conclude that such an 
Internet-streamed conference constituted invalidating “otherwise available” art. See id. at 
1350–52. 
301 See, e.g., SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1197 (“[A]ctual retrieval of a publication is not a re-
quirement for public accessibility . . . .”); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 
F.2d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“If accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to 
show that particular members of the public actually received the information.”). 
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tory bars.302 It is far from evident that courts would allow the printed 
publication bar to capture these types of references, even if changes in 
technology and norms of disseminating information make public acces-
sibility clear.303 The addition of the “otherwise available to the public” 
category of prior art means that courts will not have to make such hard 
calls.304 If the Federal Circuit so chooses, the “otherwise available” cate-
gory of prior art can provide a flexible bar focused on public accessibil-
ity and free from the doctrinal tensions of the printed publication bar.305 
Conclusion 
 Interpreting the new category of prior art in section 102(a)(1) of 
the America Invents Act—inventions “otherwise available to the pub-
lic”—is an important undertaking. This ambiguous category will apply 
to all patents filed on or after March 16, 2013, and courts and the PTO 
will soon be confronted with this interpretive issue. Defining the 
boundaries of this new category will be determinative of the validity of 
many future patent applications. Considering the apparent policy un-
derlying the new bar—to prevent inventors from withdrawing through 
a patent monopoly those inventions that are already in the public do-
main—the “otherwise available” category should be accepted as an op-
portunity to extend standards developed under the printed publication 
bar to non-documentary references. Allowing the PTO and courts to 
focus on public accessibility without regard for a reference’s form 
would relieve doctrinal tensions in the printed publication case law and 
capture references that are equally accessible, despite being in different 
forms. Further, this interpretation would allow courts and the PTO to 
respond quickly to unanticipated new technologies and new norms of 
disseminating information. 
Nathan G. Ingham 
 
302 See supra notes 291–301 and accompanying text. The hypotheticals above do not 
aim to identify the breadth of references that can be captured by “otherwise available to 
the public.” Rather, they merely aim to demonstrate the ease with which printed publica-
tion standards can be applied to new forms of references. 
303 See Diomed, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 141–42 (declining to extend the definition of “print-
ed publication” to include video recordings). 
304 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), effective Mar. 16, 
2013); supra notes 293–301 and accompanying text. 
305 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)(1); supra notes 293–301 
and accompanying text. 
